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The mention of “NASA” evokes vivid images of rockets, satellites, moon landers, and 
space shuttles. These images are indeed ingrained in the imaginations of all Americans and 
many others around the world. The accomplishments of NASA have provided dramatic stories 
about the triumphs of human ingenuity and perseverance in accomplishing lofty and difficult 
goals. The most memorable NASA programs, such as the Mercury and Apollo missions, resulted 
in sending some of the first humans into space, enabling the first humans to set foot on the 
moon, and establishing the U.S. as the preeminent spacefaring nation. These programs were 
initiated during the youth of the Agency when international competition with the Soviets was at 
its height and was funded at unprecedented levels which have not been seen since.  
NASA’s scope and mission portfolio have grown further since its inception in 1958. NASA 
now includes directorates tasked with managing decisions on programmatic investments and 
guiding field center operations (NASA, 2018a). The current mission directorates are aeronautics 
research, human exploration and operations, science and space technology, and mission 
support. These operations include eighty-five operating science missions, four programs in the 
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD), and fourteen programs in the Space 
Technology Mission Directorate (STMD). Missions and projects range from robotic and human 
spaceflight, satellites for Earth and astronomical observation, satellites for communications and 
other science, and nearly 20 years of continuous human occupation of low Earth orbit (LEO) on 
board the International Space Station (ISS). While NASA’s original purpose of beating the 





This paper seeks to identify the budgetary and structural changes in the Agency and 
changes in the political environment that highlight the development of a misalignment 
between these variables and the Agency’s current mission and purpose. NASA’s missions and 
strategic goals have expanded since the Apollo era. However, its budget has substantially 
decreased in real dollars and as a percent of federal expenditures. The alignment of presidential 
and congressional vision is also largely diminished. Finally, the Agency’s infrastructure and 
organizational structure remain essentially the same as it was 50 years ago.  
Highlighting this disconnect will proceed through an examination of 1) the Agency’s 
budget decline; 2) historical changes in its organizational model, highlighting the rigidity of 
NASA’s management structure; 3) a discussion of the changes in political discourse concerning 
the Agency and the competing priorities of political parties and branches of government; and 4) 
an analysis of NASA stakeholders’ values and objectives, and each group’s power to and 
interest in determining NASA’s organizational structure.  
This paper will then explore one of many potential solutions to some of NASA’s 
problems that periodically crops up in executive-level discussions of NASA’s performance; 
transitioning NASA field centers to a Federally Funded Research and Development Center 
(FFRDC) model. This exploration will begin by defining, providing the history and genesis of, and 
the legal basis for FFRDCs. Following, is an examination of variations in the FFRDC model, 
possible variations of implementation, an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
converting field centers to FFRDCs, and an examination of the barriers to implementation. A 
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summary and final recommendation will then be provided based on this comprehensive 
analysis. 
Budget Analysis 
In stark contrast to the continued growth and expanding mission portfolios of the 
Agency’s mission directorates, NASA’s overall budget has sharply declined since the Apollo era. 
Figure 1 shows the historical NASA 
budget since its inception. It depicts 
NASA outlays as a percentage of both 
discretionary (blue) and total 
government spending (orange) in 
solid lines mapped to the left axis. 
Figure 1 also shows the government’s 
“General science and basic research” 
(green) and “Space and other technology” (gray) categorical spending in constant 2009 dollars 
in dotted lines mapped to the right axis. Clearly, as the agency emerged and grew, its budget 
ballooned to its greatest point of 4.41% of total U.S. spending and 6.58% of discretionary 
spending in 1966. This rise and peak in spending coincided with the prioritization of the Apollo 
program in 1961. As the infrastructure and capabilities were developed and matured, spending 
began to drop. Between the 1966 budget peak and the time of the first moon landing in 1969, 
NASA’s budget had been reduced by nearly 40%. As a percentage of total spending, NASA’s 
budget has remained relatively stable since 1974, with a small rise in the late 1980s through the 
late 1990s and a gradual decline since. Although NASA’s budgetary changes are more 
Figure 1 
Source: OMB Historical Budget Tables 
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pronounced when measured as a percentage of discretionary spending, the budget trend 
remains essentially constant. The rises in NASA’s budget almost always correspond to increases 
in the “space and other technology” spending category while spending on “general science and 
basic research” appears to have no effect on NASA’s budget. 
However, as more clearly seen in Figure 2, there is a pronounced and prolonged decline 
in NASA’s share of total spending compared to its relatively constant budget. While NASA 
outlays as adjusted to 2018 dollars 
follows the trend of adjusted “space 
and other technology” discretionary 
spending and has fluctuated around 
$20 billion annually since the turn of 
the millennium, NASA’s share of total 
spending has declined by nearly 50% 
over the same period and by 89% 
since 1966.  
One may observe that given NASA’s budget has remained relatively constant, the drop 
in its share of total spending is a function of an increase in total government spending. This 
observation is indeed true. As shown in Figure 3 in Appendix A, increases in the Departments of 
Health and Human Services, Treasury, and the Social Security Administration primarily account 
for the increase in total spending. These three agencies accounted for nearly 65% of the federal 
budget as of 2017. Approximately 80% of total government spending is contained in four 
Source: OMB Historical Budget Tables, Bureau of Labor Statistics 




accounts when including Department of Defense Military Programs which is currently nearly 
15% of the total budget and has grown by 40% over the same period.  
The growth in these large accounts has driven down the budget share of approximately 
two-thirds of the smaller departments, while the other third has increased its share of the 
budget. However, of the departments that have experienced decreases, NASA has seen one of 
the greatest decreases of 89%. Excluding the General Services Administration (GSA) and Small 
Business Administration (SBA) which have been recently producing revenues, the average drop 
in budget share is approximately 45%; nearly half of NASA’s decrease. Furthermore, since 1966, 
all 32 government accounts have increased in constant 2018 dollars except for five; The Corps 
of Engineers – Civil Works, GSA, SBA, International Assistance Programs, and NASA. Of these 
five accounts, NASA has seen the most pronounced dollar decrease when excluding the 
revenue-producing SBA and GSA.  
NASA’s flat budget, the expansion of the Agency’s portfolio, the increase in mission 
costs, and the need to upgrade its aging infrastructure has created a situation wherein NASA 
cannot execute a robust, balanced aeronautics and space program (Committee on NASA's 
Strategic Direction, 2012). While the scope of its work has increased, its budget has remained 
relatively constant since its dramatic decline between 1966 and 1974, and its share of 
government spending has decreased while most other federal budgets have experienced 
continuous budget growth. Many high-priority science missions and projects, as determined by 
the National Academies’ Decadal Survey, would require an increase in budget to complete. 
While the Decadal Survey provides its own prioritization scheme for science missions 
acknowledging the historical and future budget constraints faced by NASA (National Academy 
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of Sciences, 2011), Congress and Presidential Administrations continue to press NASA to 
achieve the most highly prioritized science missions while simultaneously prioritizing human 
spaceflight. In order to fulfil NASA’s purpose of enabling the U.S. to lead the way in space 
exploration, stable funding is required (Whitson, 2019).  
There are many other problems facing NASA beyond budgetary constraints. These 
include a lack of substantive change in the Agency’s organizational structure, changing political 
environments, and ambiguity and disagreement over the Agency’s purpose. Despite these 
challenges, which will be discussed in the following sections, the conclusion clearly emerges 
that since the days of Apollo, NASA has been deprioritized and asked to do more with less, 
creating a visible disconnect between the Agency’s expected performance and its ability to 
meet these expectations. 
Organizational Structure 
NASA’s organizational structure and governance model has not substantially changed 
since the late 1960’s. Historically, NASA has been a decentralized organization giving broad 
freedom to its ten field centers and their project managers. The level of freedom enjoyed by 
managers is a condition of the Agency’s dynamic mission (NASA Office of Management, 1985). 
In the 148 organizational charts published (not including published drafts) since NASA’s 
founding, there have been frequent changes at the Administrator and Associate Administrator 
level, with dozens of staff offices being created, removed, or relocated within other offices. 
These changes often reflect shifts in the philosophies of management, oversight, and 
interagency cooperation and communication functions. NASA’s foundational legislation, the 
Space Act of 1958, endowed the Administrator with the ultimate “authority and control over all 
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personnel and activities” and has thus subjected the Agency’s organizational structure to 
changes with each successive Administrator as they develop their management styles. These 
frequent changes most often occur above the mission directorate level and attempt to optimize 
administrative functions, eliminate inefficiencies in communication and authority, and reduce 
redundancies. Occasionally, disasters provide the impetus for similar organizational changes. 
The Agency’s response to the Challenger accident included a reorganization meant to 
strengthen program managers’ roles in decision making and the creation of a new Office of 
Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (Donahue & O'Leary, 2012). 
At the programmatic and functional level, however, the organization has seen two 
primary iterations based on field center reporting structures. Field centers have historically 
reported directly to the Office of the Administrator, or to mission directorates. The issue of 
determining to whom the field centers should report has posed a continuous organization 
challenge for the Agency. Rationale for field centers to report to mission directorates is limited 
by the degree to which each center’s project activities can be closely identified with a single 
program office (NASA Office of Management, 1985). However, confusion and unnecessary 
redundancies may exist under this paradigm when a field office’s activities are more evenly 
dispersed across programs with different objectives. 
The alternative of field centers reporting to mission directorates is to directly report to 
the Office of the Administrator. While field centers primarily reported to mission directorates 
during the 1960’s, this paradigm changed in 1974 shortly after the Apollo program came to a 
close. This structure released field center managers from program Associate Administrators’ 
control over institutional and program management (NASA Office of Management, 1985). In 
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1982 as the Space Shuttle program grew out of its infancy, this structure was again reversed, 
and field centers once more reported to the mission directorates for which they performed 
most of their work. This structure endured until 2006 with only a few iterations. For example, 
an Office of the Associate Administrator for Space Station was established in 1984 and removed 
in 1990. Field centers generally reported to the same mission directorate, with a few minor 
changes such as the bifurcation of the Science mission directorate into Earth and Space 
Sciences. In this split, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) was organized under Space Science 
and Goddard Space Flight Center was organized under Earth Sciences although each center 
continued to work on missions for both categories. In 2006, the paradigm shifted back to field 
centers reporting directly to the Administrator and has since remained unchanged. 
The field centers themselves have not undergone any substantial organizational changes 
despite undergoing many small-scale changes. Center directors’ roles have not substantively 
changed other than in their collaboration and cooperation functions with mission directorates, 
program offices, and project managers. Field centers have been organized within the hierarchy 
in only the two ways discussed in the previous paragraphs. This organizational analysis 
highlights NASA’s inflexibility and apparent lack of innovation as it relates to field center 
management. 
NASA’s institutional rigidity may have negative consequences. For example, the U.S. 
may be losing its competitive advantage in space as more countries develop space capabilities. 
“Since many [countries developing space capabilities] are creating their space institutions from 
the ground up, they are not locked into the same legacy institutional structures as in historically 
spacefaring countries such as the United States” (Lal, 2018). As new spacefaring nations 
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emerge, they can build their agencies based on modern trends in governance and the global 
space economy, whereas NASA is structured around the 1960’s Cold War environment. While 
the commercial resupply and crew programs have taught NASA how to effectively work with 
the commercial sector and manage public-private partnerships (Heracleous, Terrier, & 
Gonzales, 2018), there is no evidence that NASA’s organizational structure has been an enabling 
feature of this learning.  
Political Environment 
 The NASA administrator is appointed by the President and ratified by the Senate. 
NASA’s budget and some programmatic changes also require legislative approval. Congressional 
and Presidential priorities are often misaligned. Competing priorities and varied levels of 
authority creates an environment of constant uncertainty for the Agency. Presidential 
prerogatives are expected to be carried out by the Administrator who is subject to 
congressional oversight. Furthermore, legislators hold the power of the purse and all NASA 
appropriations must be enacted annually by Congress. The President’s budget request forms 
the basis of each budget cycle but is never passed without Congressional adjustments. Although 
the President may veto any bill, the current system of passing large and comprehensive 
omnibus appropriations bills reduces the likelihood of such an event (American Council on 
Education, n.d.). Unlike 38 state governors, the President does not have any form of line-item 
veto power, as the temporary powers given in 1997 were invalidated by the Supreme Court the 
next year (Lee, Johnson, & Joyce, 2013).  
 The appropriations cycle therefore subjects NASA to potential changes in short-term 
spending decisions on long-term projects. While government shutdowns caused by failure to 
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pass a budget have been historically rare until the last decade, continuing resolutions still 
prohibit the required phasing of funds to match the development cycles of NASA’s many 
projects. Programs originating at the White House may not receive the support and funding 
they require from Congress to be successful. For example, President George W. Bush 
announced the Constellation program which aimed to send astronauts back to the moon and 
eventually on to Mars. The program would develop a new crew capsule and launch system, 
named Orion and Ares, respectively. This program was consistently underfunded, fell behind 
schedule, and was eventually discontinued by President Barack Obama in 2010 (Stromberg, 
2015). 
A congruent launch vehicle and space transportation project, the Commercial Cargo and 
Crew Programs, were initiated in 2006. The initiatives, which were designed to hold down costs 
and appease free-market Republicans, also continually faced political resistance (King, 2013). 
The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 mandated and authorized NASA’s Space Launch System 
(SLS) utilizing heritage technology and studies from the Constellation program (Creech, 2014). 
Rejection of President Obama’s policy change towards a solely private launch and crew system 
was based on Congress’ alternate opinion regarding the necessity of a government-owned 
launch vehicle. Considering the $9 billion already spent on the Constellation program, and the 
possibility of an estimated $2.5 billion in contract termination fees, Congress determined that 
the displacement of human capital, skills, and the disruption of the nation’s industrial base 
resulting from the cancellation were unacceptable (Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation, 2010). 
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 Although Congress mandated the SLS, it is still subject to the appropriations process and 
the changes in political priorities that accompany discretionary spending. Critics have long 
called the SLS a “rocket to nowhere” and criticize it as a government jobs program rather than a 
real solution to advancing U.S. space capabilities. Having suffered from constant budget 
overruns and delayed deadlines, the latest delays have caused the administration to consider 
using commercial rockets instead to begin testing the Orion crew capsule. (Thompson, 2019). 
The President’s FY2020 budget proposal suggests cutting funding for SLS by $375 million 
compared to 2019 and to defer work on the rocket’s Block 1B upgrade. This proposed cut 
would have effects external to the project, including impairing the in-process production of a 
second mobile launch platform. Program managers for the mobile launch platform intend to 
have conversations with Congress regarding this threat and plan to continue with FY2019 funds 
(Foust, 2019). However, uncertainty in the project’s future will remain until the final 
appropriations bill is enacted. Even so, that certainty will only last until the following year’s 
budget cycle begins.  
Other recent projects have faced similar threats of discontinuation. In its FY2018 
budget, the administration slated the Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud, ocean Ecosystem (PACE) 
mission for cancellation. Although Congress ultimately decided to continue its funding, there 
are real effects associated with the uncertainty. Prolonged budget uncertainty not only causes 
psychological and motivational stress for project staff, but also can lead to difficulty committing 
to long-term planning, manifest as inabilities to release project competitions (Foust, 2018), 
delays in ordering of lead-time components, and eventually project delays.  
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There are some who believe that NASA is unnecessary and that its budget could be 
better spent elsewhere. However, NASA has established legacy infrastructure accompanied by 
a low priority in its divestiture (NASA, 2018a), provides thousands of civil service and contractor 
jobs, enables the creation of thousands of small business jobs annually (NASA, 2017a), and has 
become so engrained in the conscious of the American public that politicians are unlikely to 
terminate the Agency. The purpose of NASA is simultaneously ambiguous and specific enough 
that general political agreement can often be reached. The Agency produces tangible science 
such as the Mars rovers, the Hubble Space Telescope, the International Space Station National 
Lab, creates opportunities for education, and also promotes aspirational goals such as U.S. 
leadership and deep space exploration. This wide scope allows enough room for most 
legislators to identify value in the Agency, even if the specific mission and project 
manifestations of that value are contested. 
NASA Stakeholder Analysis 
In order to better assess the efficacy of converting NASA field centers to an FFRDC 
model, it is necessary to understand the network of NASA stakeholders, each group’s values 
and objectives, and their roles and abilities in shaping the Agency’s structure. This section will 
outline the stakeholders, identify their values and objectives, and discuss each group’s interest 
in and power to shape the governance structure of the Agency.  
The Power vs Interest Matrix was developed by Colin Eden and Fran Ackermann and 
categorizes stakeholders into four groups based upon their interest in the strategic activity 
initiated by an organization and their power to influence the achievement of the strategic 
activity. Stakeholders with high interest and power are labeled “Players” and must be carefully 
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considered as they can support or sabotage a strategy. Those with high power and low interest 
are labeled “Context Setters” and must be carefully managed as they can be moved into the 
Player category and sabotage or support strategies. Actors with low power and high interest are 
labeled “Subjects” and are often the most affected by strategies. This group’s interests must be 
considered although their buy-in is not necessarily required for successful strategy deployment. 
Those with low power and low interest are labeled “Crowd” and can largely be ignored in 
strategy deployment considerations (Eden & Ackermann, 1998). This Power vs Interest analysis 
is represented graphically in Figure 4 attached in Appendix B. 
Congress: 
The group of stakeholders with the ultimate power in determining NASA’s future is 
Congress. This group controls the appropriations process, must confirm political appointments, 
and approves certain programmatic changes. Legislators have a large range of values and 
objectives. However, as most are primarily concerned with maintaining their positions and 
winning reelections, they act in a manner that aligns with their understanding of the majority of 
their constituents’ political values.  
Regarding FFRDCs, Congressional legislation is not expressly required to establish a new 
FFRDC, but the sponsoring agency must submit to Congress a report describing the purpose, 
mission, and general scope of the center (FAR, 35.017-7(a)). Furthermore, the funding for an 
FFRDC must be appropriated by Congress which can also establish, terminate, or alter an FFRDC 
through legislation. Members of Congress who do not serve on a NASA- related committee or 
do not have NASA facilities in their jurisdictions are categorized in the “crowd” considering their 
relatively low level of individual power and interest. These members are likely to vote on 
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legislation according to the direction of the relevant committees and their political party’s 
leadership expectations.   
 Within Congress however, there are multiple levels of authority and power. While 
legislation requires a vote on the floor of both the Senate and House of Representatives to 
become law, demonstrating the proportional power of each member in determining NASA’s 
future, every bill must first clear the appropriate committees. Once a bill is introduced, it is 
referred to the committee under which its contents are most aligned. If another committee 
claims to have jurisdiction over a part of the bill, there are two paths that can be taken. First, 
the primary committee can review and suggest amendments before passing it along to the next 
committee to do the same. Once each committee has voted to recommend the bill for a vote, it 
can then move to the floor for final consideration. Second, the primary committee can ask for a 
waiver from the other committee. If the waiver is granted, the primary committee will process 
the bill alone. If the waiver is not granted, the first process must be followed.  
 Committees hold significant power since they determine which bills will be given 
consideration. They are also where other Congressional business is conducted, including 
oversight and investigation duties. Appropriations bills and budget requests are first evaluated 
in Committees. Appropriations for FFRDC funding must be secured through this process. Even if 
an agency had existing funding flexible enough to independently establish an FFRDC, doing so 
without Congressional approval would likely solicit oversight and investigation, and subject the 
agency to harsh scrutiny come the next budget cycle.  
 The Congressional organizations responsible for NASA are the 1) Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation; 2) The Senate Subcommittee on Aviation and Space; 
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3) The House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology; and 4) The House Subcommittee 
on Space and Aeronautics. A list of each committee’s leadership and full subcommittee 
membership is listed in Figure 4.  
Many of the individuals on these committees and subcommittees have NASA centers or 
facilities in their districts or states. Given their positions, these individual members of Congress 
hold more power over and interest in NASA’s governance than other members. According to 
non-attributional interviews with legislative staff, members of Congress with a NASA center or 
facility in their district or state are sensitive to the economic implications of adjusting the 
Agency’s structure. Legislators campaign on job creation and protection and federal jobs are 
difficult to remove. Turning NASA centers over to private entities with greater flexibility in 
determining the size of its workforce puts considerable pressure on legislators’ claims to job 
protection.  
This group is organized in the Power vs Interest Matrix in two categories. First, the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House Committee on 
Science, Space, and Technology are categorized in the “context setters” quadrant. This group is 
highly transient and can easily move into the “players” segment when it comes time to vote. 
Otherwise, the concerns and obligations of these bodies are widely varied and are frequently 
not focused on NASA-specific business. Second, given both their interest in and power over 
NASA, the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation and Space and the House Subcommittee on Space 
and Aeronautics are grouped in the “players” category and should be carefully considered in 
attempting to change NASA’s governance models. The buy-in and support from this group is 
essential in any attempt to convert a NASA field center to an FFRDC. To accomplish such a goal 
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would require a strong case be made to these bodies for how the economic advantages would 
overcome the impact from a loss of federal jobs. A more detailed discussion on the barriers to 
implementing FFRDC conversions will explore this topic further. 
Executive Branch: 
 
 The executive branch is segmented into five relevant groups external to NASA. First, the 
President of the United States, as the chief executive, has considerable power in determining 
the structure of NASA which is an executive branch organization. The President appoints the 
Administrator and is the ultimate director of strategy, policy, and budget proposals. While the 
President must rely on Congress for leadership and budgetary approval, the President has 
considerable power in determining the policy direction through management pressures and 
executive order. For example, President Trump’s Space Policy Directive 1 (SPD1) determined 
the strategic direction for NASA regarding space exploration. SPD1 directed NASA to focus on 
building partnerships with commercial firms and international partners to focus on making a 
sustained return to the moon and then on to Mars. While this document directs NASA to focus 
its efforts on returning to the moon, it only carries the authority to affect change within the 
constraints of existing law and appropriations. As such, the President is categorized as a 
“context setter” as the President’s attention and interest is frequently focused away from 
NASA. On occasion the President can move into the “players” quadrant and exert their control 
over NASA. 
 To a lesser extent, the Vice President of the United States carries similar authorities as 
the President. The Vice President is currently the Head of the National Space Council which was 
reinstituted in 2017 by Presidential executive order. This organization is tasked with 
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establishing the nation’s space policies and incorporates civil, military, and commercial space 
interests (Berger, 2017). Serving in a research and advisory role, the Vice President and the 
National Space Council do not have executive power over NASA, but rather, influence over the 
President’s decision-making and policy formulation. The National Space Council is staffed by the 
head executives of departments and offices whose endeavors include space operation as well 
as a civilian executive secretary. The organization received criticism in the past, especially from 
NASA, for adding an additional layer of bureaucracy to an already encumbered civil service. 
However, this opinion only strengthens the observation that the National Space Council exerts 
considerable influence over NASA (Kaplan, 2017). 
 The Vice President and the National Space Council have several values and objectives. 
The Vice President aims to support the President in advancing the chosen agenda and steers 
the National Space Council in this direction. Being staffed by head executives from many 
offices, the National Space Council has many internally competing values and objectives. As a 
whole, the Council works towards increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of space 
operations and programs within its constituent offices. The Council pursues objectives aimed at 
increasing commercial competitiveness, military dominance, and supremacy in space 
exploration and science. This group is placed in the “players” category given their interest in 
and ability to influence NASA policy. However, considering the conflicting interests within the 
National Space Council and its ability to only influence others who can directly determine 
NASA’s policies, they are situated at the low end of the “players” power continuum. 
 The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is situated in the Executive Office of 
the President and serves a similar role to the National Space Council. The OSTP has been in 
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continuous existence since 1976, whereas the National Space Council was founded during the 
Eisenhower Administration, discontinued by President Clinton, and reestablished by President 
Trump (Kaplan, 2017). OSTP is tasked with providing the President “with advice on the 
scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of the economy, national security, homeland 
security, health, foreign relations, the environment, and the technological recovery and use of 
resources, among other topics” (Office of Science and Technology Policy, n.d.). The values and 
objectives of OSTP are also similar to the National Space Council, except that being an 
independent office it does not have the conflicts of interest that the National Space Council 
may have from being composed of leadership from other executive offices. OSTP is singularly 
dedicated to providing policy direction to the President based on its independent research and 
analyses. Although OSTP has a great deal of interest in NASA and the possibility of converting 
field centers to an FFRDC, it has a weaker line of communication to the President without the 
Vice President’s leadership role. It also has no direct power over NASA, its organizational 
structure, or field center governance models; only the power to influence Presidential policy 
regarding such issues. Thus, it is placed in the “subjects” category, although towards the top of 
the power continuum. 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the final executive branch organization 
with vested interest in and power over NASA. Like OSTP and the National Space Council, OMB 
has no direct power over NASA’s organizational structure or field center governance models. 
However, as the office is the executive branch’s primary organization responsible for 
government budgetary formation and fiscal evaluation and oversight, OMB has significant 
influence with both the President and other executive agencies. Most agencies are required to 
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submit substantive policy and regulatory proposals to OMB for review as to their compliance 
with Presidential priorities and goals (Haeder & Yackee, 2015). While OMB does not have any 
formal authority to change agency policy, compliance with OMB suggestions is standard 
practice (Rosenbloom, 2003). While this review process tends to set the standards by which 
agencies form internal policies and regulations, OMB does not carry the same weight regarding 
new ideas.  
For example, OMB recently conducted an independent review of the government and 
provided recommendations for reform and reorganization to reduce waste and increase 
efficiency in the executive branch. In the OMB evaluation of NASA, it recommends that NASA 
increase its use of FFRDCs by converting field centers to the model (Office of Management and 
Budget, 2018). While this recommendation has been seriously considered, and a response 
study and report provided by NASA, the authority to make such changes does not lie solely with 
OMB, NASA, or the President. Regardless, OMB can exert considerable pressure on those 
responsible for setting NASA policy. Thus, OMB is categorized in the “players” category, 
although towards the lower ends of the power continuum since its power is derived only 
through the ability to influence others in the executive branch. 
NASA: 
 While NASA is an executive agency, as the Agency targeted for structural changes, an 
analysis of the Agency’s internal stakeholders is required. The most prominent internal 
stakeholder is the Administrator. According to FAR section 35.017-2(j), establishing an FFRDC 
requires the approval of the sponsoring agency’s head. Therefore, without the consent and 
backing of the Administrator, no proposal to convert a NASA field center to an FFRDC model 
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can proceed. The Administrator’s interest in such a decision is equal to their power over it. As 
the head of NASA, the Administrator’s goals and priorities are to run the Agency effectively and 
efficiently, maintain mission achievement across all of NASA’s administrative and project 
functions, and enact the policy priorities of the President. If converting a field center to an 
FFRDC model could assist the Administrator in any of these functions without resulting in other 
negative impacts, the Administrator could be compelled to endorse such a proposal. As the only 
“player” in NASA’s internal structure, and a key component to initiating a change in the 
governance model for a field center, the Administrator’s buy-in and support is critical. 
 Other internal stakeholders include Mission Directorate Associate Administrators, Field 
Center Directors and staff, Program and Project managers, and all the rest of NASA staff. These 
stakeholders are all categorized as “subjects” as they have a high interest in the decision 
outcome but have relatively little power over influencing the decision itself. It is assumed that 
Congress, OMB, and the NASA Administrator would consider this group’s values and priorities 
but doing so is not required in moving forward with converting field centers to an FFRDC model.  
Private Sector: 
 Public sector actors are not the only NASA stakeholders. In the private sector, federal 
contractors, FFRDC and University Affiliated Research Center (UARC) operators, academia, think 
tanks, media, and the general public are all affected by NASA’s actions. Contractors have an 
enormous opportunity to profit from the Agency which had procurement obligations (excluding 
grants) in 2017 of $18.5 billion. As depicted in Figure 5 below and Table 1 attached in Appendix 
C, business firms accounted for more than $13.8 billion in contract award obligations. 
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Educational institutions, nonprofit 
organizations, and other governmental 
organizations also received hundreds of 
millions of dollars in NASA contract 
awards. Table 1 and Figure 5 also relate 
that the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 
NASA’s only operating FFRDC, was the 
recipient of more than $2.3 billion. Thus, any organization that might intend to compete for a 
contract to manage a new FFRDC at NASA has a base from which to gauge the magnitude of 
such an operation. While nonprofit organizations, JPL, and other governmental agencies are not 
primarily concerned with creating shareholder value as are their private firm counterparts, 
every stakeholder values the productive capacity they gain from NASA contracts. 
 Notwithstanding the monetary gains available to these stakeholders and the interest it 
creates in working with NASA, these organizations have no direct power over decisions 
regarding the Agency’s organizational structure. However, private firms have some power in 
their ability to lobby Congress to act in their favor. The total 2018 lobbying expenditures in the 
defense and aerospace sector was over $65 million. The top three individual company 
contributors were Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin (Center for Responsive 
Politics, 2019). Each of these companies are in the top ten recipients of NASA contract awards; 
Northrop Grumman is tenth and Boeing and Lockheed Martin are respectively the two highest 
(NASA, 2017b). Despite private industry’s lobbying influence over some members of Congress, 




governance model and are therefore categorized as “subjects” whose interests and inputs 
should be considered although it is not necessary. 
FFRDC Conversion as a Solution 
 Converting NASA field centers to an FFRDC model has occasionally been recommended 
as a solution to perceived inefficiencies, a lack of innovation, and a lack of agility in responding 
to policy and economic changes. In 2004, the President’s Commission on Implementation of 
United States Space Exploration Policy, known as the “Aldridge Commission”, concluded that 
NASA centers “are not appropriately configured to carry out the nation’s exploration vision.” 
Based on the Commission’s assessment of the inefficient duplication of processes, rigid 
personnel policies, and an insufficient priority on innovation it recommended that all NASA 
centers be transitioned through an open and competitive process to become FFRDCs (2004). In 
response, the Agency established NASA’s Organizational Model Evaluation Team. Based on its 
report, rather than increasing its use of non-governmental organizations, NASA pursued the 
approach of encouraging “healthy centers” by addressing infrastructure concerns and working 
more closely with the private sector (NASA, 2018b). 
 More recently, OMB issued the recommendation that NASA increase its use of FFRDCs 
to meet the requirements of SPD1. Citing the Aldridge Commission and the new President’s 
National Space Strategy, OMB recommended that NASA initiate a new evaluation of the use of 
FFRDCs to bolster NASA’s agility and realize the Administration’s goal of returning American 
astronauts to the moon. Specifically, OMB asserts that FFRDCs may offer increased flexibility in 
workforce management. By offering more competitive compensation and a more flexible 
recruiting process, it is assumed that FFRDCs may be better situated to attract and retain top 
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scientific and technical talent and respond more rapidly to changing R&D needs than is possible 
with a civil workforce (OMB, 2018). As OMB does not have direct control over NASA, the report 
simply suggested that NASA conduct a study exploring the feasibility of the recommendation to 
inform future White House budgets, policy plans, and proposals. NASA completed its study and 
submitted its findings to the White House on August 31, 2018. This and other reports’ findings 
will be discussed later in this paper.  
FFRDC Primer – Genesis, History, & Defining Characteristics 
FFRDCs were established during the Second World War as a means of mobilizing the 
nation’s scientific and engineering talent to address specific and sustained challenges of war-
time national security (Hruby, et al., 2011; Howieson, Clavin, & Sedenberg, 2013). Technologies 
such as the proximity fuse, advanced radar and sonar, and the atomic bomb were developed at 
these early centers (Government Accountability Office, 2008). Although operating with the 
name “Federal Contract Research Centers”, these organizations expressed the same 
characteristics and operated in the same manner as modern FFRDCs (Gallo, 2016). This model 
was conceived in 1942 with the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) sponsored by the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development.  
After the war, the need for sustained development of independent and technical 
national security capabilities remained. FFRDCs were formally established under Federal 
Acquisition Regulation 35.017, and in 1947 the U.S. Air Force established RAND as the first 
official FFRDC (MITRE, 2015). Developments in defense systems, computing, and nuclear 
weapons over the following decades allowed FFRDCs to flourish. As the popularity of FFRDCs 
grew, federal R&D funding for them increased from 0.4% in 1960 to 1.2% by 1970, followed by 
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a sharp change in Congressional, academic, military, and industrial perspectives. In response to 
a percieved lack of Congressional oversight over FFRDCs, their control over policy, their unfair 
advantage in obtaining R&D work, and sponsor-biased R&D the number of FFRDCs quickly 
receeded from a peak of 74 in 1969 (Hruby, et al., 2011; MITRE, 2015). Department of Defense-
sponsored FFRDCs fell from 39 to eight by 1976, and APL was transitioned to a University 
Affiliated Research Center (UARC) (Hruby, et al., 2011). Despite this precipitous drop in their 
use, FFRDCs evolved with the shifting perspectives and needs of government R&D and continue 
to be utilized (MITRE, 2015). As of 2018, eleven agencies sponsored 43 FFRDCs. The 
Department of Energy and Department of Defense most utilize FFRDCs, sponsoring sixteen and 
eleven, respectively (National Science Foundation, 2018).  
FAR 35.107 dictates the characteristics required of FFRDCs. They must 1) address a 
specific and long-term R&D need that connot be met by either the federal government or 
private industry, 2) work objectively in the public interest and maintain full disclosure with 
sponsoring agencies, 3) operate as an independent organization or an identifiably separate unit 
of a parent organization, 4) maintain familiarity with the needs of sponsoring agencies and 
sustain a long-term relationship that attracts high quality personnel, and 5) preserve technical 
and scientific expertise in their mandated fields. Furthermore, to establish an FFRDC, there 
must be sufficient government controls to ensure reasonable costs are being charged for 
services and expertise to evaluate its work. FAR also establishes that an FFRDC may complete 
work for organizations other than its sponsor under the conditions that such work falls within 




Upholding these characteristics is necessary for FFRDCs to achieve long-term success, 
not just because they are federally mandated (Hruby, et al., 2011), but also because it allows 
them to adapt to the changing needs and expectations of federal R&D. FFRDCs are meant to 
address R&D needs that cannot be met by either the government or private industry alone, 
thus representing a unique strategic relationship of sole-source funding in federal contracting. 
This strategic relationship is defined by two overarching characteristics; 1) special access to 
government resources and; 2)information and the longevity of the partnership.  
This special relationship and the use of non-competitive contracting has drawn criticism 
from industry and Congress (Gallo, 2016). Others argue that the sole-source contracting and 
lack of competition allows FFRDCs to maintain objectivity and alignment with their sponsoring 
agencies (MITRE, 2015). Budgetary pressures of the recent decade have also put pressure on 
the government and FFRDCs, causing some FFRDCs to expand and diversify their program 
portfolios. Industry and academic providers of federal R&D, feeling the same budgetary 
pressures, have attempted to increase their competition with FFRDCs (Hruby, et al., 2011). As 
the capabilities and competencies of the private sector have become more sophisticated, the 
claim that FFRDCs have been given an unfair and unnecessary advantage over private R&D 
firms has grown stronger. This criticism asserts that FFRDCs have deviated from their original 
intent of providing R&D that can not otherwise be provided (Professional Services Council, 
2012). However, the continued need for specialized R&D contracting, the long-term 
relationships between FFRDCs and their sponsoring agencies, and special access to government 
data that is otherwise unavailable to R&D contractors have proven to be powerful assets 
keeping FFRDCs relevant. 
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FFRDC and Federal R&D Institution Variations 
 While the FFRDC model is a legislated structure with defined characteristics and rules 
governing their formation, oversight, and continuation, there exists diversity in their missions 
and operating models (Hruby, et al., 2011). DOD developed, and the National Science 
Foundation maintains, a classification system for FFRDCs. They are classified by their activity 
types and include R&D laboratories that maintain long-term competencies, study and analysis 
centers that provide independent and objective analysis and advice to agencies, and system 
and engineering and integration centers that provide complex systems engineering capabilities 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2011; Congressional Research Service, 2016). This classification 
system allows for a broad array of R&D activities to be conducted under the FFRDC model. As of 
March of 2018, there were seven systems engineering and integration centers, ten study and 
analysis centers, and 26 research and development laboratories.  
 Like FFRDCs, University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC) are non-profit organizations 
sponsored by federal agencies to conduct research that neither the public or private sector can 
provide alone and receive sole-source (non-competitive) federal funding (Howieson, Clavin, & 
Sedenberg, 2013). UARCs are similarly defined by their long-term relationships with and 
extensive understanding of their sponsoring agencies, freedom from conflicts of interest, 
independence and objectivity, access to sensitive agency information, and the agility to 
appropriately respond to quickly evolving research needs. However, UARCs are not defined by 
federal law but rather were established and are governed by the DOD UARC Management Plan 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). UARCs also differ from FFRDCs in that they must be 
affiliated with a university or college, include education in their mission, and have broader 
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authorities to compete for public and private contracts outside of their duties to their 
sponsoring agencies (Congressional Research Service, 2016; Hruby, et al., 2011).  
 There are a few additional research institution models that are utilized for federal R&D. 
These include private or academic research institutes and private research corporations. While 
such organizations do receive some federal R&D contracts, they cannot sustain the full capacity 
of federal research needs. These organizations are funded by private firms, funded through 
research universities, or a combination of both. Therefore, they are beholden to the profit 
incentive, special interests, or the research prerogatives of their university affiliates rather than 
to the public interest. Some of the most influential and innovative research institutes, such as 
Paul G. Allen’s Vulcan Inc. and Allen Institute, and Fred Kavli’s brain institutes at Yale, Columbia, 
and the University of California, have been founded by private finance (Broad, 2014). 
These entrepreneurial, and sometimes philanthropic, organizations have proven successful in 
addressing issues that federal research has failed to target and bolstering basic science research 
in higher education which fell federally by 30% between 2003 and 2015 (Office of Research 
Services, n.d.; Science Philanthropy Alliance, 2018). However, they can also find it hard to justify 
and afford the “pure” and other long-term, agency specific research activities that government 
owned and operated R&D institutions pursue (Ewalt, 2016). 
Variations in Field Center FFRDC Conversion Strategy 
 Having introduced, characterized, and examined some variations of federal research 
institutions and FFRDCs, an examination of the possible variations in converting NASA field 
centers to this model can now be conducted. There are five options to consider: 1) not 
converting any field centers to FFRDCs or UARCs; 2) converting all field centers to either FFRDCs 
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or UARCs; 3) converting only some field centers to FFRDCs or UARCs; 4) creating new FFRDCs or 
UARCs and moving some functions and capabilities out of existing field centers to the new 
organizations; and 5) converting parts of select field centers to FFRDCs or UARCs. 
 There are several other alternatives to increasing agility such as better leveraging 
current authorities in human capital and procurement, seeking additional authorities in human 
capital and procurement, and coordinating with the federal government to establish cross-
organizational approaches to managing areas such as information technology R&D and space 
traffic management (NASA, 2018b).  However, these alternatives are outside the scope of this 
paper and will not be evaluated.  
Advantages and Disadvantages of FFRDCs 
Advantages:  
There are two primary arguments for using FFRDCs over government owned and 
operated R&D centers. First, there are increased flexibilities and organizational efficiencies 
associated with the FFRDC model. Being managed and operated by contracted non-profit 
entities, they have the authorities to expand or reduce their workforce at a comparatively rapid 
pace. FFRDCs are not constrained by the civil service laws that govern every aspect of the 
federal workforce. Most of the 3,400 civil service regulations have not changed in 100 years and 
were enacted to end the spoils system prevalent in 19th century American politics (Risher, 
2017). Specifically, the lack of restrictions on hiring and compensation enjoyed by FFRDCs allow 
for increased flexibility (Kosar, 2011). It is this freedom over hiring, firing, and compensation 
that allows FFRDCs to more rapidly adjust to changing R&D needs and attract and retain higher 
caliber talent. As federal R&D needs change, the civil service must adhere to its cumbersome 
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regulations while FFRDCs can terminate, transfer, or relocate workers rapidly. One example 
offered by multiple (non-attributional) interviewees was that of wind tunnel technicians at 
NASA’s Glenn Research Center. When utilization of these facilities is in lower demand, the 
Agency must follow strict civil service regulations and cannot remove the technician from their 
post, creating inefficiency and wasting resources.  
Furthermore, inefficient or underperforming federal employees cannot be promptly 
removed, but must first be enrolled in a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). The length of the 
program and the benchmark performance factors the employee must reach are determined 
collaboratively between management, the employee, human resources, and union 
representatives. If performance has not improved by the conclusion of the PIP, the manager 
may then place the employee on probation (U.S. Merit System Protection Board, 2015). If 
performance still does not improve, the manager may then decide to demote, reassign, or 
terminate the employee. However, this action requires a six-step process which includes human 
resources representatives, attorneys, agency management, and union representatives. (Office 
of Personnel Management, n.d.). Conversely, at an FFRDC, if a researcher is not performing at a 
certain level, management has the option to promptly terminate their employment (Howieson, 
et al., 2013). With approximately 98% of NASA’s federal workforce categorized as civil servants 
under Title 5 (NASA, 2018b), adopting new governance models with greater human capital 
flexibilities could prove very effective in increasing the Agency’s agility.  
Recruiting and hiring practices are also a burden to NASA’s agility and responsiveness to 
changing economic conditions and R&D needs. While FFRDCs can attract and onboard new 
employees from ten to 75 days, it takes NASA an average of 109 days to complete the same 
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process (NASA, 2018b). This problem is not specific to NASA but endemic to government owned 
and operated federal laboratories and R&D institutions. A broad study of federal security 
laboratories shows that young professionals are not being hired in sufficient numbers to 
replace aging personnel (Howieson, et al., 2013). Further complicating recruitment efforts, 
many R&D facilities require that personnel acquire security clearances which can take up to a 
year. Ensuring efficient hiring capabilities at all experience levels is thus critically important (The 
Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the National Energy Laboratories, 2015a) to 
maintaining adequate staffing levels and efficiently performing R&D assignments. 
 A NASA evaluation recently identified the need to more effectively use existing 
authorizations over human capital management (NASA, 2018b). By failing to fully and properly 
utilize the human capital authorities currently available to the Agency, it is allowing 
inefficiencies to exist. NASA recently established the Business Services Assessment (BSA) 
process to build an Agency-wide strategic workforce plan, modernize recruiting and hiring, 
centralize staffing and classification to facilitate consistency across the Agency, and strengthen 
supervisory accountability (NAC Institutional Committee, 2017; NASA, 2018b). While the 
Agency believes these adjustments will increase its agility and efficiency, it concedes that 
additional authorities and workforce innovations would facilitate further improvements. 
 Partially stemming from this greater workforce flexibility is the second primary 
argument for using FFRDCs over government owned and operated R&D centers; increased 
creativity and innovation. Having increased flexibility in hiring practices and compensation has 
historically enabled FFRDCs to attract higher caliber employees, resulting in greater innovation 
and preserving the nation’s technical base (MITRE, 2015; Hruby, et al., 2011). These higher 
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performing personnel are also afforded greater flexibility in their work responsibilities. That is, 
FFRDCs provide higher levels of funding to unstructured, independent R&D. Since the general 
discontinuation of NASA’s Center Director’s Discretionary Fund, the agency now allocates an 
average of approximately 2% of its total budget on independent research compared to FFRDCs 
which expend between 3% and 8% of their budgets on independent R&D (NASA, 2018b). Having 
to rely on Congressional appropriations to fund each department and many projects, NASA is 
less capable than FFRDCs in allowing such unstructured and purely innovative work time. 
The very purpose and structure of the FFRDC model as a vehicle driving R&D that 
neither the private sector or government can produce on its own encourages innovation. The 
goal and purpose of an FFRDC is to develop innovative solutions to problems that would 
otherwise remain unaddressed. The less restrictive legal structures of FFRDCs enable 
management to “do whatever is not forbidden to do by law, thus providing the basis for 
innovation and partnerships” (Kosar, 2011). However, the strength of this freedom is limited by 
the degree to which the FFRDC builds trust with its sponsoring agency through time-tested and 
proven ability to deliver (The Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the National Energry 
Laboratories, 2015b). 
Disadvantages: 
While FFRDCs provide some critical benefits to their sponsoring agencies, they are not a 
“silver bullet” that can solve all the problems in federal R&D. FFRDCs provide consequences 
that can be equally as difficult to bear as their benefits are advantageous.  First, higher 
employee compensation and non-competitive contracting generates higher variable and total 
costs that are shouldered by the sponsoring agency with diminished cost control. The increases 
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in variable costs result in higher costs for customers (Howieson, Clavin, & Sedenberg, 2013). 
However, as the customers in these relationships are federal agencies, the high costs are 
ultimately borne by the taxpayer.  
The subject of sole-source FFRDC contracting is a contentious matter with strong 
arguments on both sides of the issue. As recipients of sole-source (non-competitive) contracts, 
FFRDCs have strong pricing power over their services and operate without assuming the 
business risks or costs normally associated with federal R&D contracting (Kosar, 2011). These 
noncompetitive contracts expose the government to increased risk stemming from its lack of 
negotiating leverage otherwise available in a competitive environment  (Government 
Accountability Office, 2015). This pricing structure has frequently come under attack by critics 
of the FFRDC system who view increased competition as the best way to decrease costs and 
increase quality (Gallo, 2016). 
Yet, increased agility is one of the foundational characteristics of FFRDCs. By the 
Department of Energy’s estimates, competing FFRDC contracts takes approximately 18 months 
and can cost the contracted center between $3 million and $5 million to prepare a bid (2009). 
This process is substantially time consuming considering the average procurement time of 
FFRDCs is between 93 and 143 days (NASA, 2018b). If this pattern holds true in competing all 
FFRDC contracts, one of the primary benefits of an FFRDC is greatly diminished. 
Furthermore, using competitive contracting to reduce the costs of FFRDCs runs contrary 
to one of their foundational characteristics as determined in the FAR; that their work be of such 
a nature that neither the private or government sectors can alone fulfill the R&D requirements, 
and thus, is not suitable for competitive bidding. Therefore, it stands to reason that if an FFRDC 
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fulfills the requirements of the FAR, it necessarily cannot be subjected to competitive 
contracting, and will therefore be more expensive than a government owned and operated 
R&D center. In this circumstance, supposing the R&D need has been deemed essential, the high 
costs of operating an FFRDC may be justified. If the majority of a FFRDC’s work can be 
competitively contracted, the center is likely no longer necessary, and the high costs of its 
operation no longer appropriate.  
Absent substantial research about how many FFRDC-awarded contracts could qualify for 
and the government benefit from increased competitive contracting, an acceptable proxy 
measure may be the rate at which sole-source FFRDC contracts are protested. A protest may be 
filed by any interested party with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) over the award 
or proposed award of any procurement contract by federal agencies. However, subcontracts 
are not subject to protest (U.S. Government Accountability Office, n.d.) These protests are 
submitted when parties believe that contracts have been unfairly or unlawfully awarded. 
Therefore, if a sole-source contract has been protested, private industry believes the contract 
could be competitively sourced. However, NASA found that contracts issued to FFRDCs are 
rarely protested. While the 2017 government-wide contract protest rate was 17%, NASA 
sustained a five-year rate of 9% and FFRDCs maintained a rate even lower (NASA, 2018b). 
Additionally, a sharp rise in Department of Defense bid protests over the last seven to twelve 
years has been found to increase the appeal of utilizing sole-source FFRDC contracting (Defense 
Business Board, 2017). 
However, FFRDCs frequently issue mission-supporting subcontracts that are not legally 
subject to protest. Thus, it is difficult to differentiate between the ability to competitively offer 
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these FFRDC-awarded contracts and industry’s desire to participate in such competitions. 
Similarly, the findings of the Defense Business Board are difficult to attribute to the Department 
of Defense’s intent to reduce its time to acquisition and the risk associated with assessing 
highly technical solutions in the face of a steady decline in its technically-capable workforce or 
its desire to simply avoid the resulting disadvantages of competitive contract bidding. Despite 
the shortcomings of this analysis and the need for more substantial and empirical research, the 
reality remains that due to higher salary expenses, FFRDCs are proportionately more expensive 
than government owned and operated R&D organizations. The debate over reducing the costs 
of FFRDCs through increased use of competitive contracting exists wholly as a function of this 
high cost and has, itself, consumed additional government resources. 
The second primary disadvantage is that the independent management and operating 
structure of FFRDCs may lead to issues in accountability. Naturally, there are arguments on 
both sides of the issue of agency oversight of FFRDCs. There is concern that greater oversight 
can be draining to the sponsoring agencies and constraining to the FFRDC (Gallo, 2016) but 
there has also been Congressional concern regarding several agencies’ ineffective oversight. 
This concern stems in part, from several high-profile incidents such as the loss of two computer 
hard drives, the mishandling of classified information, and the partial blinding of a student at 
the Los Alamos National Laboratory (Struglinski, 2003; O'Driscoll, 2003; Gallo, 2016). Several 
other instances of insufficient agency oversight have also been documented. In 2015, the GAO 
conducted a study on behalf of the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in the 
Committee on Veteran’s Affairs found that the Department of Veteran’s Affairs, which 
obligated approximately $244 million to FFRDCs, had incomplete authority to review its FFRDC’s 
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contractual arrangements with outside parties (2015). Another GAO study found similar 
barriers to effective oversight in the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human 
Services, and Homeland Security (2008).  
There are several approaches that sponsoring agencies use to conduct oversight of 
FFRDCs. First, agencies review and approve the work assigned to the FFRDCs to ensure that it is 
consistent with the scope, purpose, and capacity of the FFRDC. Second, agencies conduct 
financial audits and performance reviews of internal controls. Third, as stipulated in the FAR, 
agencies must conduct a comprehensive review of the FFRDC before renewing its contract 
(GAO, 2008). Other contractual mechanisms may allow agencies to enact corrective actions and 
punitive restrictions on FFRDCs should they fail to meet obligations, although some argue that 
these failures should not result in increased regulations over all FFRDCs (Stepp, Pool, Loris, & 
Spencer, 2013; Gallo, 2016). 
In general, two thought paradigms exist regarding the government’s role in exercising its 
oversight responsibilities; an entrepreneurial approach and the public law approach. Those 
favoring the entrepreneurial approach to public management value organizational and 
managerial flexibility and using numerical performance measures. Those favoring the public law 
approach argue that the purpose of agency oversight is to implement the laws of Congress, not 
to maximize performance, and therefore prefer a democratic practice of accountability over 
efficiency maximization (Kosar, 2011). 
Within hybrid organizations such as FFRDCs, where funding and oversight is provided by 
the government and operation and management duties are conducted by the private sector, 
these two schools of thought are at odds. The oversight of FFRDCs is mandated in the FAR to be 
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conducted by the sponsoring agencies, thus performing the democratic governance function, 
while the private FFRDC operators strive for efficiency and outcome performance. In this 
environment, there exists a strong propensity for conflict. Surveys indicate that FFRDC 
employees have indeed experienced conflicting oversight by Federal agencies (Howieson, et al., 
2013). However, while each agency sponsoring an FFRDC is subject to the same federal laws, 
agencies often develop their own processes and procedures for conducting their oversight 
duties. While these differences are generally insignificant, threats to effective evaluation can be 
overcome by sharing knowledge and best practices between agencies (Government 
Accountability Office, 2008).  
It has been suggested that an effective method of agency oversight includes reducing 
the level of scrutiny of detailed technical and administrative functions while expecting a high 
standard of transparency from FFRDCs. Cited as an example of this model is the NASA Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory which has 30 federal employees compared to Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory which has 130 federal employees, despite the organizations’ similar budget 
sizes (Miller, 2012; Howieson, Clavin, & Sedenberg, 2013; The Commission to Review the 
Effectiveness of the National Energry Laboratories, 2015b). Harkening back to the issue of 
competing FFRDC contracts, a 2003 report found that competition creates discipline and 
prompts quality performance that oversight alone cannot inspire (U.S. Department of Energy 
Blue Ribbon Commission on the Use of Competitive Procedures for the Department of Energy 
Labs, 2003).  
Partially due to ineffective oversight and competition with the private sector, the 
diversification of FFRDC research activities or partners, called “mission creep,” becomes 
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another concern of Congress. Whether this mission creep develops out of a loosely defined 
FFRDC mission statement or an FFRDC’s desire or being compelled to compete with the private 
sector, allowing an FFRDC to expand its operations into a new field or take on new clients is 
contradictory to the stated purpose of an FFRDC (Gallo, 2016). If an FFRDC is properly 
established according to the regulations in the FAR, there should be no uncertainty as to the 
organization’s mission and purpose. The sponsoring agency must clearly identify its R&D needs 
and fully explain the agency’s and private industry’s capability gap in providing the service. 
Mission creep rising from poorly defined mission statements is entirely the result of poor 
oversight by both Congress and the sponsoring agency. Similarly, if mission creep develops 
because the FFRDC is actively seeking to expand its portfolio with external partners or if the 
advocates of increased competition drive this behavior, the poor oversight of the sponsoring 
agency is to blame. Mission creep can reduce the impact of an FFRDC’s contractual output as it 
diverts resources to the additional work.  
Several methods are used by agencies to mitigate mission creep in their FFRDCs. The 
Department of Energy, for example, has placed a cap on the amount of work its FFRDCs can 
perform for other agencies in the amount of 20% above the FFRDC’s operating budget. If the 
work is estimated higher, a comprehensive agency review of the FFRDC’s ability to effectively 
continue its contractual obligations and agency approval is required before the work can begin 
(Task Force on Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National Laboratories, 1995). 
Congress has also placed limits on the ability of the Department of Defense to establish new 
FFRDCs and dictated annual limits on the amount of Staff Years of Technical Effort (STE) that 
DOD FFRDCs can use in its work for the agency (Government Accountability Office, 2008; Gallo, 
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2016). By limiting the FFRDC’s allowable working hours, the goal is to force it to prioritize work 
for the agency over competing alternatives. However, the GAO has identified gaps in each 
agency’s oversight duties despite these measures (GAO, 2008; 2015), illuminating continued 
Congressional concerns over inadequacies in FFRDC oversight and accountability. 
Barriers to Implementation 
Many FFRDCs have been terminated and some, such as the Applied Physics Laboratory, 
have transitioned to the UARC model (Hruby, et al., 2011). However, there is no precedent for 
converting a government owned and operated R&D facility to an FFRDC. There are some 
examples of management changes within FFRDCs and some qualitative evaluations of 
transitioning federal laboratory governance models that highlight the negative effects on the 
workforce stemming from such a conversion. Transitioning to an FFRDC would require 
terminating the majority of the center’s workforce leading to high rates of demoralization and 
loss of institutional knowledge (non-attributional primary source interviews at OMB and NASA). 
NASA would likely require in the foundational management and operation (M&O) contract that 
the FFRDC operator first extend employment opportunities to the displaced NASA employees. 
However, given NASA’s aging workforce, it is believed that many workers would prefer to 
accept their terminations, collect their severance pay, and retire.  
Not only would eliminating these civil service positions and offering contract buy-outs, 
severance pay, and early retirement be prohibitively expensive, eliminating civil service 
positions is not an easy legal undertaking. The process is laden with legal procedures and 
fraught with expensive ramifications should it fail to be fully followed. Requirements during a 
workforce restructuring include offering voluntary separation incentive payments, voluntary 
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early retirement, and career transition assistance programs. Each of these options must be 
offered to federal employees before the process of layoffs can begin (Office of Personnel 
Management, n.d.). The government may be sued not only for activities such as discrimination 
and retaliation for whistleblowing, but also for ignoring any of the applicable civil service laws 
and regulations (U.S. Merit System Protection Board, 2015). Given a reduction in force of the 
magnitude represented by eliminating a NASA field center, it is reasonably expected that 
several law suits would ensue. Regardless of how NASA might fare in these decisions, the 
litigation expenses alone could become an unacceptable burden to the Agency.  
On a large scale, it has been observed that a government-wide transition of federal 
laboratory governance structures from one form to another is neither advisable nor warranted 
(Howieson, Clavin, & Sedenberg, 2013). While incorporating positive attributes of various 
governance models into one another may provide some operational benefits, it has also been 
observed that “even management changes that do not alter the basic governance concept can 
be disruptive” (Howieson, Clavin, & Sedenberg, 2013). A National Research Council study of the 
National Nuclear Security Administration’s laboratories showed that the transition from an 
FFRDC run by a nonprofit to an FFRDC run by a consortium, inclusive of nonprofits, led to staff 
frustrations, an increase in technical staff turnover, and increased costs of the two contracts by 
approximately $200 million per year stemming from increased management fees, changes in 
healthcare and pension benefits, and changes in state tax obligations (National Research 
Council, 2012; Howieson, Clavin, & Sedenberg, 2013). Considering the constrained NASA budget 
as already discussed, the expected financial burdens of a governance model change in NASA 
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field centers, specifically the upfront costs associated with a reduction in force followed by the 
sustained increase in compensation, are likely prohibitively expensive.  
This barrier becomes even more salient when considering NASA’s historic challenges in 
meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals. Despite the Agency’s record of successful 
missions and revolutionary developments, it also has failed to meet its cost, schedule, and 
performance goals for many of these projects. For example, the Hubble Space Telescope was 
originally projected to cost $200 million and be complete by 1983, when it was actually 
completed and launched in 1990 at a cost of approximately $1.2 billion. Similarly, the James 
Webb Space Telescope was projected to cost $2.6 billion and launch in 2014 but has already 
exceeded $8 billion in costs with a launch date extended into 2020 (NASA Office of Inspector 
General, 2019). The SLS is another high-profile case of NASA’s failure to deliver projects within 
budget and on schedule. Specifically, the NASA Office of Inspector General attributes these cost 
overruns and schedule delays in NASA’s inadequate oversight and contract management 
practices (2018). Furthermore, the GAO has listed NASA on its “High Risk List” since 1990 over 
persistent cost and schedule overruns (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2019). Each of 
these projects involved large-scale contracting and acquisition activities. The consistent failure 
of NASA to control these activities provides further context for the theory that FFRDC 
conversions of field centers will result in unwieldy cost increases. 
Additionally, NASA identified five top risks associated with converting a field center to 
an FFRDC. These top five risks were selected based on potential schedule and risk impacts. Risk 
from technical and research areas of focus is ranked as the top risk due to a high probability of 
occurring and its high impact on both schedule and cost. NASA’s explanation of this risk factor 
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points to the unique purpose and mission of an FFRDC and the accompanying unforeseen 
obstacles of cutting-edge R&D (NASA, 2018b). However, given NASA’s existing role in 
developing specialized and unique technologies, this risk assessment seems to inaccurately 
present this risk factor as a differentiating element of the FFRDC model.  
The second most impactful risk NASA identified is the risk of delays due to external 
factors. Citing legislation and funding processes outside of NASA’s control (NASA, 2018b), the 
Agency again seems to incorrectly attribute this risk to the FFRDC conversion as a 
differentiating factor. As previously discussed, NASA already faces a tumultuous political 
environment and uncertainty in the annual appropriations process. The NASA report fails to 
explain how the conversion to an FFRDC would result in any increase in this risk. The remaining 
three risks listed by NASA are of similar consequence. That is, reflective not of new risks 
associated with an FFRDC conversion, but rather the continuity of risk currently assumed in 
NASA’s operations. 
However, politics is the most powerful barrier to converting NASA field centers to 
FFRDCs. Congress generally takes an incrementalism approach to legislation. For example, 
although the unmanned aerial systems (UAS) market is rapidly propagating through all sectors 
of the world economy, Congress has been hesitant to mandate new rules and regulations 
governing both the development of safe UAS infrastructure and the establishing of safety 
measures to protect critical assets and national security operations against hostile or errant 
UAS. Absent a highly visible disaster demanding of immediate and decisive action, Congress is 
accustomed to slowly implementing innovative legislation. Given Congress’ generally slow pace, 
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it is unlikely that converting a civil service agency center to an FFRDC for the first time will 
happen. 
Furthermore, the impetus to convert NASA field centers to FFRDCs has not been 
demonstrated in terms of Congress’ values and objectives as discussed previously. This 
conversion would directly eliminate federal jobs from the states and districts of legislators, 
which is a direct assault against their primary values and objectives of creating and protecting 
jobs. To ask a legislator to vote for the conversion of a field center in their district is to ask them 
to vote for removing reliable, high-paying, and rewarding jobs from their constituents in order 
to implement a risky and untested strategy with no demonstrable advantages over the existing 
system.  This aspect is arguably the greatest obstacle to transitioning NASA field centers to 
FFRDCs. Unless an important individual on a powerful committee is convinced of the efficacy of 
such a plan, most likely by a comprehensive analysis which provides empirical evidence that the 
conversion would most certainly result in substantial economic development and secondary job 
creation, the plan has nearly no chance of success.  
Summary 
 NASA is continually being asked to do more with less. Since the precipitous decline in its 
budget following the Apollo program build-up of the mid-1960s, NASA’s budget has remained 
relatively flat in constant dollars although its share of the federal budget has been in steady 
decline. Despite this relative budgetary decline, the Agency itself has continued to grow, adding 
several mission directorates, field centers, and undertaking several large-scale projects like the 
Space Shuttle, the International Space Station, and the Space Launch System. This discrepancy 
exemplifies the apparent mismatch between the Agency’s mission statement and its resources. 
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 Furthermore, NASA’s organizational structure and governance models have undergone 
relatively little development or change since the Agency’s inception. With the primary changes 
being a shuffling of mission directorate authorities over the field centers and the creation, 
closure, and relocation of administrative offices within the executive level, NASA has displayed 
relatively little innovation regarding its governance and management structures. Combined 
with several high-impact catastrophes, the Agency faces consistent scrutiny from the legislative 
and executive branches which often have competing values, priorities, and expectations of 
NASA. 
 The executive branch’s values and expectations of efficiency have occasionally led to the 
recommendation that NASA adopt the FFRDC model for its field centers. The perceived benefits 
of this model include increased flexibility in workforce management, agility and responsiveness 
to changing economic and political influences over federal R&D needs, and the ability to attract 
and retain higher caliber employees leading to increased innovation. While these benefits exist, 
there are additional burdens and disadvantages of the FFRDC model including increased costs 
of operation, unfair competition with the private sector, and mission creep resulting from 
reduced accountability and government oversight.  
 While there are several feasible implementation variations of the FFRDC model, the 
disadvantages of and barriers to converting field centers to FFRDCs in any of these alternatives 
are so great as to prohibit such a transition. Such a restructuring of the NASA field centers 
carries excessively high costs to implement and maintain. Considering the costs, a lack of 
evidence that the conversion would be beneficial to the economy at large, and that converting 
a federally owned and operated R&D center to an FFRDC has never been undertaken, Congress 
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is unreceptive to such a proposal. Despite the executive branch’s insistence that the conversion 
would increase government efficiency and productivity, NASA leadership is similarly 
circumspect in their evaluation of the proposition. The only variation that has any level of 
support outside of the executive branch is the option of establishing new FFRDCs for 
specialized, emerging long-term missions. 
Recommendations 
 Based on this analysis, several paths forward are recommended. First, as referenced in 
NASA’s response study to OMB, it is agreed that the agility and responsiveness issues in the 
larger system of civil service human resources should be addressed. The benefits packages and 
job security provided in the civil service are attractive but appear to be increasingly perceived 
as less valuable by younger generations. Perhaps the full cost of accounting to communicate 
the true monetary equivalent value of civil service jobs is not being adequately leveraged in 
attracting top talent. The cumbersome system of employee performance evaluation and due 
process is certainly restricting to agility and innovation, and the government’s time to hire 
ratios are abysmally high compared to the private sector. Facing an increasingly aging 
workforce and lagging in the recruitment of young professional talent, it is recommended that 
NASA and other interested parties advocate for the execution of studies to determine the best 
methods for instituting civil service reforms aimed at increasing speed and agility while 
maintaining the important protections currently embedded in the system. 
 Second, while the discussion of risk factors is largely absent in this paper, as recently 
noted by Daniel Dumbacher of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), 
in the wake of the Challenger and Columbia disasters NASA has become an increasingly risk-
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averse agency; to the extent that innovation and advancements have been stifled (AIAA, 2019). 
It is therefore recommended that NASA and other interested parties conduct risk assessments 
of NASA’s critical human spaceflight missions, explore the methods, including the possibility 
of using FFRDCs, by which the Agency can mitigate risk, and develop the methods that allow 
NASA to pursue its programs without such restrictive and inhibitive policies and procedures.  
  Third, the establishment of new FFRDCs for the purpose of providing specialized 
capabilities in support of emerging Agency needs may be advantageous and is the only 
currently feasible avenue for NASA to increase its use of the FFRDC model. Examples of 
specialized, long-term emerging needs include developing in-situ resource utilization practices 
and infrastructure and developing permanent lunar facilities and support systems such as the 
planned Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway. If new FFRDCs are to be established, it is essential 
that buy-in and support be secured from the critical stakeholders, such as private industry, the 
National Space Council, and most importantly, Congress. Congress will require assurances that 
the new FFRDC is truly necessary to achieving NASA’s mission if it is to appropriate the 
additional funds needed to establish the FFRDC. These costs can best be justified by conducting 
a study on the full lifetime cost of employment in the civil service, a metric which is not 
currently reflected in agency financial statements or considered in Congressional 
appropriations deliberations.  Industry will require that any new FFRDC be free from unfair 
competitive advantage. This can be accomplished by demonstrating that the FFRDC could be 
sized so that it does not contain the internal capacity to complete all its objectives without 
issuing mission-critical subcontracts to private industry.  
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 Fourth, if the establishing of a new FFRDC were to be authorized, it is recommended 
that the FFRDC be located within the same geographical region as the field center with which 
its purpose most closely aligns, thus creating quasi-experimental conditions for future 
economic impact analysis. If new FFRDCs can then be empirically shown to improve regional 
economic conditions in addition to increasing agency efficiency and innovation, the prospect of 
converting NASA field centers to FFRDCs could gain traction in Congress, with sponsorship and 
advocacy from one or several influential legislators.  
Finally, as the primary obstacle to transitioning NASA field centers to FFRDCs and the 
only remaining basis of analysis yet to be appropriately or effectively conducted, it is 
recommended that an empirical economic study of the regional economic impacts of an 
FFRDC be conducted. Regardless of NASA’s path forward regarding FFRDCs, this study must be 
conducted and peer-reviewed. Otherwise, the arguments will never have a chance of being 
genuinely considered by the parties with the true decision-making power.  
 NASA’s history is full of accomplishments and achievements that have captured the 
global imagination. A lasting testament to the creativity, ingenuity, and perseverance of the 
human spirit, NASA will remain an inspiration to innovators, leaders, and pioneers for 
generations to come. Whether it endures as a nexus for visionary progress and exploration or 
recedes into the realm of memory and legend will be determined by the actions of leaders 
today. Hopefully, this investigation, in some way, can enhance the conversation and help 
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Table 1 - NASA Contract Awards by Type of Contractor in FY17
Category Value (millions) Percent of Total
Business Firms $13,827.7 74.7%
Educational Institutions $880.2 4.8%
Nonprofits $924.5 5.0%
JPL $2,352.6 12.7%
Gov't Agencies $171.3 0.9%
Outside U.S. $346.2 1.9%
Total $18,502.5 100%
*Source: NASA Annual Procurement Report FY2017
*Source: NASA Annual Procurement Report FY2017 
